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THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVEIDPMENT*
1. The Problem
A basic concern of the theory of economic development is to explain
the entry of continuing technological advance into "traditional" societies.
Throughout all of human history until the last few centuries, in every
society technological progress has been so slow and so intermittent that the
trend is most appropriately described as constancy, and advances as dis-
continuities. But within the last two hundred years, in a number of societies
technological progress has become so rapid that output per worker in the
society as a whole increases considerably each decade. I define this rate
of increase as "continuing technological progress."
By this imprecise but sufficient definition, such instances of
accelerated innovation as that in ancient Rome and that in Florence and
Venice during the Italian Renaissance were not "continuous technological
progress." The line drawn is not merely one of convenience. Where
technological progress has become sufficiently rapid and sufficiently
widespread to increase productivity markedly per decade for as much as
*This paper is, in a sense, the first product of a research project
which I shall be directing during the coming three years, with the aid of a
grant to the Center for International Studies by the Rockefeller Foundation.
The paper presents a first statement of tentative hypotheses. I am
acutely aware that many of the hypotheses need elaboration and enrichment
that may lead to qualification and restatement. Constructive or destructive
criticisms will be gratefully received.
I am indebted to James Abegglen, Francis Bator, Karl Deutsch, Richard
Eckaus, David Gleicher, Suzanne Keller, Howard Perlmutter, Ithiel Pool,
Jean Pool and Iucien Pye for helpful criticisms of an earlier draft. I
am sure that none of the critics fully endorses my treatment of the problem.
1
2three decades, the advance has continued subsequently,1 whereas a number
of spurts too brief or insufficiently pervasive in the economy to meet
this test have proved to be temporary. The rate and breadth of advance
is not necessarily itself the cause of continuing progress, but it is
evidence that the causal factors underlying it have taken hold so deeply
that they have changed the nature of socio-economic processes.
The type of traditional society taken as the starting point of
analysis in this essay is one based on settled peasant agriculture. No
analysis is made of prior development; the accumulation of knowledge,
techniques, arA capital and the development of culture and social structure
up to the time when peasant agricultural society exists is taken for
granted.
What is the natural history of the transition of a society from
traditional peasant agriculture, with its static technology, to a state
of concinuing technological advance?2
1. In every case where the record is clear. There are one or
two uncertain cases.
2. Few non-economists since Weber and Tawney have displayed interest
in tha question. Several economists have ranged outside the economic
field. Professor J. A. Schumpeter has discussed entrepreneurship as a
key fs.ctor in development, in his Theory of Economic Development and
elsewhere. Professor B. A. Keirstead, in his Theory of Economic Change,
recogiizes the differing effects of differing "institutional frameworks."
The range of both men, however, is too limited.
Professor W. W. Rostow has addressed himself brilliantly to the more
generaL question. See his The Protess of Economic Development (New York:
Norton 1954), and "The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth, "Economic
Journal, March 1956, pp. 25-48. But he has concerned himself primarily
with the period of rapid change which he terms "the take-off," which he
defines as follows: "The purpose of this article is to explore the following
hypothelts: that the process of economic growth can usefully be regarded.
as discontinuous, discontinuity centering on a relatively brief time
3The answer to the question lies partly within every one of the
behavioral' sciences. But there is as yet no universal social scientist.
The problem must be attacked initially by someone whose competence is
less. In this essay, mustering up such expertise as I can from the
several behavioral scienceb I therefore address myself to the entire
question, in the hope that the initial effort will stimulate continuing
interdisciplinary analysis.
If continuing technological progress is to occur, various activities
must take place: (1) Continuing advance in pure science. (2) Continuing
conception and translation into operation of new production techniques.
(3) Various types of skilled labor. (4) Innovational business entrepre-
neurship. (5) Innovational political, governmental, and social administration
of various types. This list suggests the range of performance that is
necessary. There are similarities among the activities. It is a basic
thesis of this essay that the number of activities that are distinct in
the sense that the emergence of each requires separate explanation is
small, so that the major forces explaining the transition to continuing
technological progress in any human society may be comprehended in bold
outline in a fairly simple analytical model.
interval of two or three decades when the economy and the society of
which it is a part transform themselves in such ways that economic growth
is, subsequently, more or less automatic. This decisive transformation
is here called the take-off." ("The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth,"
Op. cit., p. 25.) He assumes as given the social economic changes
underlying the take-off. (He recognizes fully their importance. See
op. cit., pp. 25-28.) Usher has attacked the problem in its entire
breadth and depth, in the revised edition of his History of Mechanical
Inventions (1954). But he does not use the full battery of tools of
analysis now available. For example, he rejects the developments of
psychoanalytic theory, regarding it as "less consistent with the empirical
point of view that the position taken by the gestalt psychologists."
Ibid., p. vii.
2. Elements of Change
A traditional peasant society is a society of agricultural villages,
consisting of a virtually unchanging group of families. Peasant agri-
culture is the basic occupation of all or almost all of the families.
Methods of production are primitive and unchanging. Productivity is low.
Since writing is little needed in village life, literacy is probably
low. The family is the unit of organization for purposes of production.
This identity between family and production unit which originates in
peasant agriculture, is apt to be maintained as trade or other forms
of economic activity gradually enter the economy. There too family
members form the business enterprise.
The family may be the nuclear family of the West, consisting of
husband, wife, and children, but it is more apt to be the extended
family, consisting of several generations, and to be patriarchal, the
oldest male making decisions for the group. For as family members marry,
they continue to live close to each other, and relations must be regu-
lated. Further, to cope with the mysterious forces in the midst of which
life is carried on, the longest experience is the wisest guide.
Business relationships and all other interpersonal relationships
in the village are among individuals and families who must live in
intimate lifelong contact. Hence not only within the family but through-
out the community, the harsh relations of contract and fixed legal rules
are impossible. Enforcement of a contractual relationship that in the
event worked hardship on one of the parties might create bitterness that
could corrode village relationships. All interpersonal relations are
therefore subject to mutual accomodation and adjustment according to the
consensus of the village elders.
A
5Relationships with other villages may be limited to a trickle of
trade. If so, it may be that no code of national interpersonal ethics
has developed parallel to that which binds members of the village
together. To individual members of the village strangers not guests
of the village may be fair game for banditry or personal violence; and
even where national authority has developed and social standards forbid
violence, the code of honesty and mutual responsibility of village life
probably does not rpply to strangers, who are fair game for craft, guile,
and deception. Because no national code of individual rights has developed,
the limits to capricious or arbitrary seizure of property or imprison-
ment of individuals by the government or the society's leaders are not
clear, if they exist at all.
Some structure of classes exists. Vertical mobility may conceptually
be considerable at the one extreme, as in Burma or China, or it may range
through the very limited mobility in pre-Meiji Japan to the rigid caste
system of India or the rigid feudalism of medieval Europe. Whichever
situation prevails, individuals who constitute the vast majority view
themselves as performing a given activity and function in life and do
not conceive of their status and the circumstances impinging on them as
subject to their influence. Various cultural inheritances from earlier
periods, explicable only in terms of the history of each soc:bty, may
govern many aspects of life.
This description does not apply to the whole of any "underdeveloped"
society today. Every society has felt the impact of contact with the
West. Part of the society has become urbanized, and there is some measure
i
6of interaction and interdependence with other societies. But the
relationships sketched here in broad outline are elements of the present
society of the great majority of the people of every "underdeveloped"
country today, and we will not understand the past or future process of
transition unless our analysis begins with these social relations.
What changes mist occur in such a society if it is to enter upon
continuing technological progress? This section identifies the types of
change which are associated with this transition. These elements of change
are discussed here under six heads: technical knowledge, interpersonal
relations, social status, cultural lags, economic factors, and motivations.
The categories as stated are not mutually exclusive,. but the headings are
convenient, and the scope of each will become clear in the discussion.
The elements are stated in their most general form, so that they are
applicable to a centrally controlled and authoritarian society such as
the Soviet Union as well as to a mixed or private enterprise economy.
No specified degree of any given combination of these changes is a pre-
requisite to the economic and technological transition. Section 3
attempts to formulate some tentative hypotheses about the necessary inter-
action among them.
Technical knowledge
The society must acquire new technical knowledge, ranging from
literacy to elements of modern science.
Technological advance and advance in scientific ideas are mutually
interdependent. The rate of scientific advance depends also on the previous
accumulation of scientific knowledge. For every invention or scientific
7discovery is a combination of previousLy existing ideas. The larger and
the more basic the stock of existing scientific ideas, the larger is the
number of possible new advances; and the possibility increases vastly#
more rapidly than the increase in the accumulated stock of knowledge.3
Technological advance frequent enough to constitute a continuing flow
becomes more and more feasible as the increase in scientific knowledge
accelerates.
The exuberant scientific advances of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries reached a climax in the great Galileo-Newton theoretical
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synthesis concerning the iature of the physical world. This synthesis
and the concomitant discoveries in mathematical and physical method
provided an expanding base for continuing scientific and technological
progress. Before the saventeenth century, continuing technological
advance was highly improbable in any society. But because the existing
stock of scientific ide3as is now available to every society in the
world, lack of scientific basis is no longer a bottleneck preventing
development anywhere, Ideas existing in one culture are not necessarily
available to another culture; but the difficulties involved lie in the
social structure ard the motivation of the technically non-progressive
societies, not in the limited nature of human technical knowledge.
3. With two items, only one combination is possible; with three,
four; with four, eleven; with five, twenty-six.
4. See Alfred North Whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy
(New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1948), Chapter on "The First
Physical Synthesis" (pp. 166-176).
8Interpersonal relationships
5In Levy 's terms, the society must move in economic relationships
from "particularism" toward "universalism," and from "functional diffuse-
ness" toward "functional specificity." By particularism or ascription
is meant the selection of one's associates on the basis of one's personal
relations to them (e.g. family membership); and by universalism, selection
on the basis of objectively evaluated capability to perform the function
at hand. By functional diffuseness is meant the undefined nature of rights
and duties in interpersonal relationships. In local relationships, the
term comprehends both the indefinite liability of each individual to
meet claims of members of his family and the indefinite obligation to
yield individual claims if they conflict with the welfare of the community.
From one viewpoint, it signifies an absence of individual rights. The
change from custom and personal relationships to contract and the rule
of law is a change from functional diffuseness toward functional specificity.
The new ethics must extend to national knd international relations.
The individual must move toward respect for the person and property of
everyone in the society and in the international community. This implies
5. Marion J. Levy, The Structure of Society (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1952). 1 believe that the basic set of categories is
originally Parsons'. See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds.,
Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1951), pp. 80-91; and Parsons, The Structure of Society (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1951). pp. 58-67.
I am following Levy's terminology. Parsons uses the terms diffuseness
and specificity without the adjective . functional, and includes part of
the content here included under particularism and universalism under the
terms ascription and achievement respectively.
9an end to banditry and personal violence, the end of capricious seizure
of persons and property by group or national leaders, and acceptance of
contractual commitments by individuals, national leaders, and the
government.
The need for the changes indicated is obvious. Insofar as individuals
are motivated to select their associates in economic functions on the
basis of their capabilities rather than according to the accident of
personal relationship, the level of ability applied to each task in the
economy will be higher and, other things being egualprogress will be
faster. Diffuseness of rights and obligations, at least within the
family, does not necessarily lessen economic incentive; one may be as
eager to imprOve the economic status of one's family group as one's
own. Diffuseness of rights and obligations with the firm similarly may
be favorable to economic development. However, the indefiniteness of
property rights and of business obligations outside the family hampers
the accumulation of capital from outside the family and creates uncer-
tainties of costs and income which hamper the operation of almost any
economic venture that is producing for the market.
The differences between traditional and "modern" societies with
respect to both functional diffuseness -- specificity and particularism-
universalism are ones of degree. Relations in traditional societies
are not wholly diffuse. And some degree of particularism is present,
even in business relations, in every society. No given development
10
of universalism, functional specificity, and law and order is an absolute
prerequisite for economic development. If these have developed only in
small degree, other forces may nevertheless bring about the transition,
and if they do, the requirements of the new economic relationships will
alter these social relationships subsequently.
In the setting in which they are typically found particularism and
functional diffuseness may further, not impede, business relationships.
The arbitrary imposition of contract in a traditional society may not
aid economic development; rather, by preventing ethical adjustments by
the customary process of nutual accomodation, it may merely disrupt all
economic relations. Or, as another example, where one can neither trust
a stranger or an acquaintance as a business associate, nor persuade him
to lend one money, then the extended family.may be a necessary source of
capital and a necessary bond between business associates. Its abolition
would not modernize the society; in the circumstances it would merely
paralyze large-scale business relationships.
Further, even the assumption that movement away from particularism
and functional diffuseness in all important economic relationships will
occur at some time in the course of economic development may be unwarranted.
Japan's economic progress is among the most rapid in the world's history.
Yet particularistic and functionally diffuse relationships persist within
her business firms, and in her culture they seem to have aided, not
hindered, her economic onrush.
11
Social status
The society must move toward a class structure conducive to
technological change. Any class structure will present some barriers
to innovations that may alter relative social position, and this is
certainly true of all important economic innovations. Feudal lords,
guilds, a landed gentry, absentee landlords, or a moneylending class may
be injured by technological change and the changes in relative power
accompanying it. The greater the power of such groups to block adverse
changes, the greater the deterrence to the commencement of technological
progress.
Moreover, if the class structure prevents or curtails communication
of certain sorts, it will obviously block economic change. More generally,
the greater the constriction of comimunication, presumably the greater
the barrier to economic and technical change.
Perhaps the most interesting generalization that can be made con-
cerning the relationship of class structure to economic change relates
to social mobility in the society. The nature and degree of social
mobility may greatly affect the likelihood and pace of economic change
by affecting the incentive to make it.
It is often mistakenly stated that the incentive to economic change
is the greater, the greater the degree of social mobility. But this
statement is incorrect or at least seriously incomplete.
The true relationship is somewhat as follows: the social structure
is most conducive to economic innovation if:
12
(1) The possibility of social rise via traditional types of activity
is at a minimum. In ways that are discussed in Section 3, below, ease
of ascent to positions of esteem and power via traditional activities
lessens the incentive to seek new fields of achievement.
(2) The possibility of gaining entry into the traditional channels
of social ascent by initial economic prowess is at a minimum (thereafter
rising via traditional types of activity).
(3) Rise in social power and esteem through economic prowess is
possible.
The history of China and Japan illustrates the point. In China,
high social prestige was associated with status as landed gentry. Trading
was in low esteem, but members of a family that was under economic pressure
sometimes left the land and turned to the less respectable occupation
of trading in order to improve the family's fortune. However, movement
from trade upward to landed gentry status was possible. Hence persons
who made money in trade moved back to the land. This mobility deterred
economic development by channeling energies back toward "landedness ."
In Japan, on the other hand, where a strictly feudal class structure
existed and mobility between classes was not possible, the merchant class
could not escape from its role. Purchase of land was illegal, or at
best not protected by law, and a trading family that bought land had no
recourse against its seizure by a feudal lord. Hence no road to security
13
except economic power was open to trading families. They continued to
devote their energies to trade, and, when opportunity occurred, to
economic innovation. This devotion of energies was a significant force
toward economic development. 6
Class structure probably affects economic change in a number of
other and perhaps more important ways. The theory of the relationships
is yet to be developed.
Cultural lags
The society must dissolve inappropriate cultural inheritances of
various kinds.
A trait firmly fixed in the culture by the intensity of the emotional
stress out of which it first arose may persist long after it no longer
serves an important function, and may be an important barrjir to economc
innovation. A conspicuous example of such a barrier is the pervasive
demands made by loyalty to family in China. Less important ones are the
taboo on killing animals in Hindu India, and certain elements of the
caste system.
Some writers would state that religious beliefs of certain types
are among such cultural traits. While this is true of specific religious
practices, for example, those cited in the preceding paragraph, the
6. -See Marion J. Levy, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization
of China and Japan," in Kuznets, Moore, and Spengler, ads., Economic
Growth: Brazil, India, Japan.
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statement is not helpful as applied to religious systems as a whole.
The religious system of a society is a complex projection from the
needs, fears, and social relationships of the society. To state that




There are several economic institutions which economists sometimes
list as prerequisites for economic development. One set of these is the
institutions necessary to finance "social overhead capital" projects.
Another set is those conducive to an adequate rate of saving. Both
statements need careful qualification.
7. Some writers, I suspect, would state that one of the culture
traits that must change is traditionalism, which must change to ration-
alism. This statement, I think, involves verbal confusion. The terms
traditionalism and rationalism, like the term continuing technological
progress, describe complex patterns of behavior, each of which is a
resultant of a number of elements. Traditionalism is the philosophy or
practice of following tradition in some field of behavior; it involves
unchanging behavior in the field referred to. Rationalism is the philo-
sophy or practice of guiding behavior by objective criteria of the
suitability of the behavior to the desired end; it may involve changing
or unchanging behavior. The transition from static technology to con-
tinuously changing technology is sometimes said to be the transition
from traditionalism to rationalism in production. The accuracy of this
statement is doubtful. Unchanging technology may be entirely rational
in a peasant agricultural society, and the transition may be from a
situation in which unchanging technology is appropriate to one in which
continuous technological change is appropriate. (This statement, if
generalized, has implications concerning the entire concept of tradi-
tionalism. In its social environment, traditionalism may be rational.
The concept of traditionalism may be an ethnocentric concept held by
individuals who apply the criteria of their culture to a different
culture.) However that may be, to state that traditionalism must change
to rationalism is of the same order of generality as to state that static
technology must change to continuous technological progress. It defines
a problem, rather than stating a causal element in the problem.
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Many types of social overhead capital -- capital which serves many
industries and the economy generally -- are economic only in large units.
Examples are transportation and power facilities. Hence their financing
requires institutions either to accumulate large aggregates of capital
or to encourage the flow of capital from abroad.
Social overhead capital is obviously important in the transition.
A national capital market in existence when the need for social over-
head capital arose would be a factor favorable to economic development;
but it is difficult to conceive of this situation, since typically before
the need for social overhead capital exists a national capital market
would serve no function and could hardly have come into existence .8
In some circumstances the provision of capital from outside the economy
for large social overhead projects will permit technological change
to proceed while the institutions of a capital market are gradually de-
veloping and other necessary changes are occurring, whereas otherwise
it would be retarded.
But many types of technological progress in traditional societies
are possible without large units of physical capital, for example,
improvements in methods in agriculture and cottage industries, mentioned
above. In fact, such changes in England preceded most of the social over-
head capital formation, and it is arguable that the latter was asmuch
the effect as the cause of the transition. It is probably true that
8. Joint stock trading companies were formed in Britain by public
subscription long before the Industrial Revolution. The device, however,
was not thought applicable except for these rather speculative ventures,
and was used hardly at all to finance canals or toll roads until these
had become fairly common.
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in many instances where lack of social overhead capital is advanced as
the reason for lack of development in traditional societies today, in
fact the social structure and motivations necessary for development are
little developed in any case and development would proceed anly haltingly
even if the social overhead capital projects were constructed in generous
quantity.
If motivations and other conditions conducive to development exist,
and other aspects of technological innovation have proceeded to the point
where lack of social overhead capital is a serious deterrant, means of
financing it will probably be devised, by the government if not privately.
The concept of social overhead capital as a key prerequisite, without
which development cannot proceed, and with which it would race ahead,
is a completely unrealistic one.
Economists sometimes list as a basic deterrent to technological
progress lack of a sufficient flow of savings to finance the necessary
capital formation. This idea seems to me to constitute in unusual degree
a confusion between cause and vehicle.
It is true that capital formation has been and may be expected to
be important in technological progress. It is also true that the rate
of saving is low in traditional societies. But the questionable link
is the assumption that the rate of saving is low because of the need in
some absolute sense to consume virtually all of output, and that the in-
ability to save is the deterrent to capital formation.9
9. The absolute flow of saving will of course be low, because
income is low, but a flow (net of capital consumption) equal to say 10
per cent of income will permit technological progress just as truly as
will a flow equal to the same percentage of income in a high income economy.
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The main basis for belief that peasant societies are at a physio-
logical minimum level of consumption and hence cannot save much is an
ethnocentric one. Because we, the members of a Western society, could not
live at the level of income of peasant societies, much less save, we assume
that the members of peasant societies cannot save.10 By the same reasoning,
however, they could not live. But they do. A considerable amount of evidence
suggests that with favorable motivations they could also increase their saving
and capital formation. No people, even at the lowest level of living recorded
in peasant agricultural society, devotes all of its income to providing for
the physiological necessities of life. An appreciable share is devoted to
festivals, construction of temples, and accumulation of gold, gems, or other
symbols of position. Further, historical accounts suggest that the economies
of traditional societies were typically slack rather than "taut." Labor was
not used to the maximum. Thus inability to spare productive resources for
capital formation does not seem to have been the cause of low capital formation.
The evidence is persuasive that the problem is one of the psychological and
sociological conditions, rather than one of the physiological minima.
10. In support of this thesis, it is stated that the rate of
saving in traditional societies increases only as income rises. The facts
are uncertain. Available data are too poor to give precise information.
But in any case if this relation. sometimes or typically holds, it provides
no indication which change is the cause of the other, or whether common forces
cause both. It is plausible that motivations that lead to increased saving
and capital formation also lead, at the same time, to technological advance
or fuller utilization of productive resources or both, and hence to higher
income. As another alternative, there may merely be a Keynesian relation
between investment and income. This taken alone seems the least likely expla-
nation, but this relationship may be a contributing factor.
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It is also true that Westerners have until recently consistently
underestimated the rate of "productive investment" in traditional
societies, because much of it has not passed through the money market.
A series of national income studies of "underdeveloped" economies has
shown capital formation higher than had been estimated before detailed
examination of the economies had been made. It follows both that the
rate of saving has been higher than often assumed, and that the increase
in investment necessary for technological progress is less than has
often been assumed.
Motivations
If the transition is to occur, the operation of motivations in
traditional societies must change. While it is certainly true that the
typical member of virtually every society prefers more goods to less,
other things being equal, this motivation conflicts and competes with
other motivations. The relationship to technological progress of change
in motivations themselves and of environmental acceptance and recognition
is discussed in Section 3, below.
It is plausible to believe that certain complex motives, of which
the persons who possess them are often unconscious, are closely related
to the problem of technological progress.
To understand how such motives may be acquired, consider achievement
motivation, or the need to achieve -- an attitude of a person by which
he gains pleasure and satisfaction from attacking problems that involve
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unknowns, and hence a risk of failure, but one of a type that can be
controlled by the exercise of his abilities. In this performance an
achievement-motivated individual strives to meet an internalized or
"built-in" standard of excellence. It should be noted that both a need
to succeed and a need for independent or autonomous effort are involved
in athievement motivation. 1 1
Social psychologists are now well aware of the processes by which
this and other motives may develop. Mother-child relationships are of
crucial importance. For example, a baby finds that his mother does
things which satisfy his viscerogenic needs -- his hunger, desire for a
comfortable temperature, desire for a dry skin, and so forth. Because
his mother is the source of all that is good, lie may tome to feel satis-
faction directly in her presence, and anxiety--tension--in her absence.
By a further association, he may feel satisfaction and security in her
approval and anxiety in her disapproval. As he grows, he will find
repeated occasion to explore an unknown environment. If when he does
so -- when he toddles, plays boisterously, wanders down the block, tries
to use his own knife, tries to dress himself , or makes his own truce
11. Achievement motivation has been studied by David C. McClelland
and his associates. See David C. McClelland, John W. Atkinson, Russell
A. Clark, and Edgar L. Lowell, The Achievement Motive (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953). They treat it as a single or unitary motive,
but its dual composition is implicit in their discussion. Though Marray,
in his original listing of needs, defines n Achievement and n Autonomy
separately, an element of need for.autonomy is clearly present in his
n Achievement. See H.A. Murray, Explorations in Personality (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 156, 164, and passim.
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(or warfare) with his playmates, he senses in his mother a repeated
attitude of fear at venturesome action, or disapproval at his initial
ineptness or at the inconvenience he causes her, he may come to feel tension
in any independent action, and to feel security in dependence. If, on
the contrary, she lets him face tasks alone at as early a date as he
can accomplish them, rejects him if he turns to her for help, and shows
pride and love in his successful self-reliance, he may come to feel the
same security and emotional satisfaction in meeting new problems "on his
own" that he felt as a baby when his hunger was satisfied or his skin
soothed.
The individual is similarly influenced by !is relations his father,
his brothers and sisters, his playmates, and other early associates. He
is influenced by his reading, the radio, television, and the movies, and,
indeed, by all of his associations throughout his life. Nevertheless,
the contacts with the persons on whom the baby is dependent are by far
the most important, and contacts in early life are crucially important.
By the age of say eight years there will usually be built into an indi-
vidual a degree of motivation toward achievement which will set both a
floor and a ceiling to his initiative. Except under very unusual circum-
stances neither will change much throughout life.
Experiencing and mastering risk -- the risk of failure to meet one's
own standard of excellence when venturing into the unknown - is apparently
an essential element in the satisfaction derived from achievement. This
risk should be distinguished sharply from chance or uncertainty. The
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risk that i _tvates to achievement is risk that can be mastered by the
exercise of one's capabilities. Challenge of this sort is encountered
in performing any non-routine function, and is encountered in a higa
degree in creative scientific endeavor or innovational political, govern-
mental, or social administration, as well as in innovational business
entrepreneurship. Many economists have defined the function of business
entrepreneurship as risk-taking, meaning the taking of economic risks.
But the basic risk is that of failing to meet one's standard of excellence,
and business entrepreneurship shares this risk with many other functions.
The studies by McClelland and his associates may so far have yielded
only a gross and imperfect understanding of achievement motivation -- as
they would perhaps be the first to assert. They apparently believe that
"achievement motivation" is a single motive, like hunger, not the complex
result of a group of motives, and that a person acquires, not a motive
to achieve in a given area, e.g. art or warfare, but a generalized motive
to achieve, which is channeled into one or another field by the values
with which the person comes into contact after acquisition of the motive.12
Both judgments are questionable. "Achievement motivation" may be complex,
a bundle of elements.13 Further, at the time that a child acquires his
12. See loc. cit., passim. The facts discussed by McClelland himself
in a 1955 paper strongly suggest the opposite to me. See D. C. McClelland,
"The Calculated Risk: An Aspect of Scientific Performance," (mimeo.) a
paper delivered at a conference -n scientific creativity sponsored by
the National Science Foundation at Brighton, Utah, August 27-30, 1955.
13. Certainly, for example, the cause of varying degrees of effort
to achieve, among a number of persons, may be either varying degrees of
achievement motivation, or may be an equal and high degree of achievement
motivation in all of the persons countered in varying degree by an (un-
conscious)fear that achievement is dangerous because it threatens to
rival an authority who should not be rivaled, for example, the person's
father. Yn other words. a nassive and non-exnloratorv nerson may ainly
be not motivated, or he may be highly motivated but inhibited,
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motivations, the achievement motive he acquires may be, not a general
one, but motivation to achieve in a given type of performance.
Related to need for achievement is need for autonomy or freedom from
control or restriction. Contrasted to both is need for dependence.
Presumably a person whose early nurture has created in him a high degree
of need for dependence will throughout his life be bound by unconscious
bonds from thinking effectively about questions to which there is nc
routine answer. For if he explores, he may venture ideas or behaviors
which he fears would be unacceptable to the individual or group with which
he associates himself, whose values are emotional yardsticks that he
carries with him. More important, by independent thought he would be
rivaling the person (or persons) to whom he mist feel dependence for
comfort, even if the thought were acceptable; and such rivalry is forbidden
by his need for dependence.
Such influences are important in determining a person's choice of
occupation. An individual feels satisfaction in a given activity or
occupation, not for the logical "reason" that he may advance, but
primarily because the activity or occupation recreates in him feelings
of security and pleasure that he lit as an infant or a child. For
example, early experiences may cause some achievement-motivated children
to find pleasure in rivalry with or manipulation of other persons.
Others, while achievement-motivated, may have developed unfavorable
emotional reactions to such interpersonal relations, and may seek to
achieve in activity which obviates the necessity for them. McClelland
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has suggested14 that as between business and science, such a reaction
determines the choice of achievement-motivated persons. Those who
enjoy interpersonal relations choose business; those who do not, choose
science. Of course, the terms "business" and'science" are used far too
broadly in this hypothesis; but it would probably be possible to define
two sets of occupations, choice between which is determined largely by
precisely the influence indicated.
The broader question arises, what influences direct individuals into
any given occupation, out of the total number that are open to them
(which may of course be small)? pecifically, what influences direct
them into economic, technical, or scientific innovation, rather than
into some other activity? Obviously, possession of need for achievement
or for power is not an explanation. Persons motivated by either or both
may instead develop an effective system of government administration, or
may make advances in art, philosophy, or literature, or as a group they
may conquer their neighbors.
Psychologists do not know the answer to the question. I suggest
some possible influences below. An individual will channel his energies
into science or business, and will be an innovator, given a sufficiently
14. In his Brighton, Utah, speech, loc. cit., p. 8. Evidence of
the importance of such influences is an eloquent commentary on the lack
of realism of the economic assumption that a man's choice of occupation
is determined by his desire to maximize his ecmomic income. The lack
of realism does not necessarily impugn the analytical usefulness of the
assumption for static analysis.
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high degree of intelligence, if in his early life he acquired on a
number of occasions the following "feelings,"15 and especially if these
feelings are reinforced by the values of his social environment as he
grows older:
(a) A view of his environment as subject to being influenced by him.
(b) Need for autonomy.
(c) A feeling of achievement in manipulating or studying the physical
world.
(d) A feeling of power in manipulating or studying the physical
world. The power that is relevant may be an extension or magnification
of oneself through control (actual or intellectual) of some power of
nature or science, or by some early association it may be power over other
persons.
(e) A feeling that such activity wins recognition from his "reference
group," the group whose esteem gives him satisfaction.
(f) A"direct" favorable emotional attachment. It is probable that
a child breathes in ("learns") satisfaction in some activities or
occupations, and discomfort in others, in ways not comprehended by
(c), (d), and (e) above from the contentment of his parents (or other
early associates whose emotional reactions affect him strongly) in some
situations, their discontent in others, their reverence or respect for
some persons or symbols, their antipathy to others. It may well be that
X
15. In psychological terminology, "affective states."
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these direct emotional attachments plus the esteem attached by the
reference group to a given occupation channel a* the individual's general-
ized drives for autonomy, achievement, and power into a specific occupation,
so that (e) and (f) are the crucial variables in determining the field
of work, and (b), (c), and (d) determine the nature of the individual's
activity within that field.
This list is undoubtedly neither complete nor fully correct. But
it may be a useful starting point for analysis.
The importance of the reinforcement of these early attitudes by his
society has been mentioned. A person whose early motivations are affirmed
by the approval of his culture as he grows older is impelled systematically
in a given direction; if his early motivations are contradicted, he is
16
confused and unhappy. In a traditional society, an individual's
experience tends to inculcate in him the same motivations, attitudes, and
values that his parents and their ancestors possessed. One of the
crucial questions of economic development is, How does a person acquire
motivations different from those of his elders?
16. The fact that in a. changing society, many individuals are
driven by the need of making a living into jobs that do not satisfy their
early motivations is an important source of industrial, social, and
political unrest.
This discussion omits the situation in which early motivations are
themselves contradictory--perhaps an even more important source of
difficulty in a changing industrial society.
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This list of influences determiming a person's use of his energies
during his lifetime does not include the one assumed by many economists
to be the basic relevant motive, namely the "economic motive" or "goods
motive," the desire to maximize income. This is because the goods motive,
though real and powerful, is initially merely the surface reflection of
the influence already discussed. Goods are wanted because they symbolize
achievement or accomplishment of the processes of production to which
there was initial emotional attachment, or give power or prestige.
A secondary goal, once learned, may become a goal in itself, and
economic reward may become a symbol without which motivation is lacking.
However, unless economic effort yields social status, it may not be felt
to constitute achievement.
3. The Process of Change
The path from a traditional state to one of continuing technological
change is a long one, in logic, and for every society which has made
the transition in the past, in time as well. The elements of change
sketched in Section 2 are cumulative changes, occurring over a long
course of development. The problem of the transition is the problem,
not merely of the final change to continuing technological progress,
but of the preceding long sequence of change from a traditional state.
The concept of a traditional society, in which no change in insti-
tutions or techniques occurs over time, is an ideal form, an analytical
model, rather than a description of historical reality. However, all
the elements in it have existed historically, and exist in many societies
today. It is only the concept of equilibrium in such a state that is
unrealistic. But the equilibrium concept is a useful starting point
for analysis.
Such an equilibrium implies absence of any tendency to increase one's
rate of economic income. It seems a safe principle that between two
rates of income flow, almost any individual in any human society
will like the greater of the two as well as or better than the smaller,
other things being equal, and that the modal preference of the members
of a group will be for the larger flow. Exceptions to this rule must
be so rare that they can be treated as abnormal cases. But this fact
does not interfere with the concept of a society in which no change in
per capita output is taking place. For the desire for increased income
is counteracted by other forces determining individual behavior.
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In a traditional society, applying energy and income from other
uses to the study of production methods promises little achievement,
power, or prestige, since Aruitful change in production methods lies
outside the experience of the society. On the other hand, it involves
fulfilling obligations to one's family less well, neglecting religious
duties, losing esteem through lessened contributions to festivals, etc.
Occasional technological advance may occur in two ways. First, the
more or less random action of intelligent minds may bring discovery of
17
improved methods. Secondly, in any society some deviant individuals
appear. Some combination of influences during the early years of life
makes an occasional individual dissatisfied, tense, driven to use his
energies in unconventional ways, including devotion of more than the
typical amount of energy to the study of the physical world, or to
technological innovation.
From time to time, therefore, new techniques will be discovered.
Some, because their use involves change which runs sharply counter to
attitudes and values in the society, may not be adopted, but some will
be. In the typical society, over time there will be technological advance,
though the advances may be spaced so far apart in time that the society
is appropriately described as technologically in static equilibrium, with
advances as discontinuities.
17. A term which includes Alexander the Great and Henry Ford as
well as village fools and tinkerers.
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From this stage, what is the course of transition to a state of
continuing technological progress? Two conflicting theses may be sketched.
For convenience I shall term one of them techno-economic, the other
sociological.
When consideration is centered on technological and economic
factors, the transition to continuing technological progress seems to
have the inevitability of mathematical logic. With the accumulation of
scientific and technological knowledge, the rate of discovery of new
techniques will accelerate, simply because there is a growing body of
ideas in existence to be combined into new ones. As the prospect
increases that the devotion of energy to science or technical innovation
will be fruitful, the balance of attractiveness between various activities
will gradually shift, even though traditional roles and activities remain
absolutely as attractive as before. Thus a steadily increasing number
of individuals, and ultimately large groups, will devote their energies
to the new activities. Appropriate changes in economic and social
institutions will be induced. The trickle of technological progress
will become a rivulet, a current, and finally a rushing tide.
This theory is implicit in much economic thinking, and underlies
the assumption by many economists that economic or technological changes
alone will bring economic development. The evidence of history and
general principles of sociology both suggest, however, that the model is
unrealistic.
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It suggests a steadily accelerating rate of change. But gradual
acceleration to a stage of continuing technological advance does not
seem to have been the typical course of technological progress. Indeed,
such inexact historical knowledge as is available suggests that it may
not have been the sequence anywhere. There was so marked a change of
pace at some point in the transition, not only in Britain, but also in
the countries of Western Europe and those Latin American countries where
a transition seems to be near completion that a surge of change, rather
than acceleration, seems the appropriate description. The concept of
gradual acceleration runs into especial difficulty in explaining the
transition in Japan, that in the Soviet Union, or those which seem
to be under way at present in China and India.1 8  *
It is possible to argue that gradual acceleration may have been
the underlying trend in each of these societies, and that when some
especially favorable event was superimposed on that trend, it brought
a surge. Such an event might have been a scientific or technological
"breakthrough," a major increase in economic opportunity, the stimulus
of a new economic problem facing the nation, a collapse of opposition
by vested interests, or some other. In Japan, the Soviet Union, China,
and India, the favorable event was the coming into power of a government
eager to aid the transition. In this view, the surge is fortuitous;
gradual acceleration would have completed the transition without it.
18. The emergence of continuing technological progress in the
United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada was not by transition
from traditional or other pre-industrial societies. These cases are
rather to be regarded as offshoots of the transition in Britain.
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In support of this thesis it may be argued that with a favorable
tide under way, there are virtually certain to be some occurrences which
will aceelerate the rate of change. However, the realism of this explana-
tion is questionable. In every case for which we have reasonably good
data, a surge has occurred. The apparent universalism of surges suggests
that they are an integral part of the process. Further, the hypothesis
is inadequate to explain all of the phenomena in which the student of
economic development must interest himself. It requires us to include
under the heading of "fortuitous" events so closely related to the
transition as the Meiji restoration in Japan and the Bolshevik revolution
in Russia. These were caused by a desire for change. A hypothesis that
encompaqps them would be preferable to one that must treat them as acci-
dental or exogenous. This objection may be generalized. Basic social
changes are necessary throughout the course of the transition. Due
modesty requires that before concluding that these merely follow along
after economic change, economists inquire what sociologists know about
the processes of social change.
Economic change involves social change. It is a historical truism
that socially dominant groups are not only not motivated toward economic
change, but will oppose it, to protect their position. The one exception
is that they may adopt it if it offers protectioh against outside pressures
or internal revolt. Further, a movement toward important technological
change in any traditional society, since it will involve major social
change, will meet with strong resistance not only from dominant groups
32
but from individuals throughout the society. Important technological
change is apt to require changes in individual occupations not sanctioned
by existing values. These may disrupt family relationships. Both the
family relationships and the other social relationships may be sanctioned
by religious teachings, to which the new activity may run counter. For
these several reasons, it may meet with disapprobation, low valuation,
contempt; it may be regarded as undignified, sacrilegious, "queer." The
weight of parental and patriarchal influence may oppose it. There may
be positive social and political action against it. Radical social
change is therefore not apt to occur by gradual acceleration.19
The long sequence of radical social changes which constitutes the
transition probably occurs, not merely by the action of deviant individuals,
but only when some sizeable group within the society exerts great energy
toward that end. Only groups that are "subordinated" or fear "subordination"
will do so. Before stating the sociological theory of the transition,
19. If one regarded neo-Malthusian population theory as realistic,
one might find in it additional reason to question the possibility of
gradual acceleration of technological change. I do not advance the
relevant argument here, however, because I believe that there are good
reasons to regard neo-Malthusian population theory as not realistic. To
discuss them would require more space than is available here. I hope to
do so in a later paper. I will merely note the empirical fact that there
seems to have been no case anywhere in the world in which continuing
technological change, as defined here, once under way, was subsequently
"swamped" by population increase, so that per capita income failed to
rise cumulatively. I believe that this is not tautological, fortuitous,
nor due to biological limits on population increase, but rather that
there are forces not encompassed in present population theory which may
be counted on to prevent population from rising as rapidly as aggregate
income, once the virus of technological advance has taken hold.
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it will be useful to consider the theory of "subordinated" groups. In
the extreme case, such a group may be an entire society. The case in
which it is a group within a society will be considered first.
A society is never perfectly integrated, in the sense that the
motivations and values held by all of its constituent groups are consistent,
and the role of each group in the society satisfies the emotional needs
of the group. Some groups will be at' a relatively disadvantageous and
unsatisfying position in the social structure. The lines of their
differentiation from dominant groups may be ethnic (Jews, Negroes, many
immigrant groups), or on the other hand may be purely or almost purely
cultural (many of the Dissenters in England, various classes under
feudalism). For want of a better term I shall call such a group a
"subordinated" group, but the term should not be thought to imply
necessarily ar subordination in civil or political rights. The discrim-
ination may be purely social.
I have no suggestions to offer concerning the emergence of group
subordination, beyond the sociological platitude that if two groups
with different cul4ures come in contact, some friction between them is
apt to occur. Beyond this it seems sufficient to assume group subordina-
tion as an event in the stream of human history.
I suggest that a crucial fact with respect to the transition is this:
the tensions arising in a subordinated group, and between that group and
other groups in the society, may tend to inculcate in the young motivations
radically different from those that had been transmitted from generation
to generation before the tensions arose. As examples of how this might
14
34
occur, when parents are tense, the home environment of the child will
differ in various and subtle ways from that in previous generations with
tensions absent; relations of children with children not of their group
may have high emotional content and may therefore be of unusual influence
in creating motivations; youths of the group may form groups of tieir
own, with mores and standards different from those of their elders (so-
called "youth cultures").
If such a change in motivations occurs in many members of a younger
generation, or over several generations, the widespread approval within
the group of new modes of behavior will insulate its members in consider-
able degree from the inhibiting effects of the disapproval of other groups
in the society. Thus group pressures may both change the unconscious
motivations that govern a man's use of his energies, and provide reinforce-
ment for the new motivations throughout his life. It is a tentative thesis
of this essay that reaction of a subordinated social group to its subordination
has been a central force in each step of change from traditional society,
and specifically that such a reaction by a subordinateigroup, in favorable
circumstances, is requisite for the final surge by which continuing techno-
logical progress is institutionalized in a society.20
What are the necessary favorable circumstances? One is that the
society, or groups in it that are important numerically and otherwise,
have previously moved some distance from a traditional state with respect
20. The take-off is like the last stroke of a chisel that splits a
stone, no more important causally than previous strokes, nor different
in general nature from them.
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to the complex of elements of change discussed in Section 2. However,
as has been suggested in Section 2, no given degree of any of these
changes is a prerequisite. The circumstance that perhaps comes closest
to being an absolute prerequisite is existence of and access to an
accumulation of scientific knowledge sufficient for rapid continuing
sci*ntific and technological advance. But even the accumulation of
scientific knowledge that is necessary will depend on the amount of
energy poured into the process and on the economic circumstances.
A second favoring circumstance is that the subordinated group has
an ideal of high or indpendent status -- presumably arising from their
previous history -- so that their reaction to subordination is revolt,
not submission.
A third is that release from subordination via achievement in
traditional modes of activity is barred. And a fourth is that opportunity
21
for increase in power through economic achievement exists.
Various fortuitous events will of course affect the success of the
final surge. However, the presence of subordinated groups, eager to take
advantage of them seems more important in an analytical model than the
fortunate events which may loom large in an historical account.
The analysis so far has explained how a subordinated group may be
motivated to economic zeal, and may enter upon continuing technological
progress. One further condition must exist if the activity of the inno-
vating group is to spread to the society as a whole and complete the
21. Concerning these third and fourth points, see pages 11-13 above.
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transition. The group must not be so alien -- so different from other
groups -- that its activity creates emotional antipathy rather than
desire to achieve equal success by doing likewise. If the society is to
follow the innovators, it must have common cultural bonds with them.
Otherwise, their very success may create a drive for their suppression.
The Dissenters led the Industrial Revolution in Britain, but Jews were
suppressed or expelled in many places and Huguenots in others.
The history of colonial areas, if read in the light of modern
psychology and sociology, illustrates the nature of a society's reaction
to an alien group. Westerners possessing advanced techniques came to
traditional societies and subordinated the indigenous population. Why
have the latter in many places been slow to react by economic achievement
in an attempt to escape their subordination?
The Westerners were aliens, who subdued the indigenous peoples by
force. In virtually every colony they also disrupted the native culture
and violated its deepest ethical and moral values.22 The result of such
disruption and of the apparent hopelessness of rebellion is to create
emotional uncertainty that almost certainly has two important relezant
effects. First, it militates strongly against the acquisition of
22. For example, in some areas, by introducing Western systems of
land ownership by individuals in fee simple they destroyed rights in land
that were the basis -of community life and that were sanctioned by sanctions
as deep-seated as, say, the right of parents to rear their own children
in 'the West. By introducing Western law and rules of evidence they insured
that court decisions would flaunt basic moral codes. By introducing contract,
they deprived the unfortunate of their right to community alleviation of
the unforeseen rigors of a tricky agreement. They showed contempt for
religion. Etc.
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achievement motivation and of a view of the world favorable to initiative.
Secondly, it creates an intense need to hold on to the old values that
alone stand between life and chaos, hence a deep unconsdious antipathy
toward the new occupations and new economic roles introduced by the aliens.
Thus colonial administration effectively blocked incentive to participate
in economic development, even where it provided capital and knowledge of
advanced techniques.23,24
In Japan, on the other hand, the aliens created fear of subordination,
but they did not occupy the land, disrupt its culture, and occasion the
antipathy to their occupations which they created in colonial areas.
This contrast between Japan and other Asian countries in relations with
the West is perhaps of basic significance in explaining the rapid devel-
25
opment of Japan. Consideration of the history of Japan suggests the
generality of the theory of reaction to subordination.
23. The unconscious blocks to interest in the new occupations are
not inconsistent with imitation of certain cultural values of the aliens--
e.g., thxeir sports, their dress, various of their attitudes. On the
contrary, certain principles of psychiatry suggest that the two modes
of behavior are to be expected at the same time. This problem, however,
involves too great a digression to discuss here.
24. I discuss this aspect of colonial administration in the case
of one country, Burma, in a monograph now under preparation, mend1oned
25. It should be noted that this thesis concerning colonial areas
and concerning Japan is a construction by the writer. So far as I know,
no sociologist or anthropologist has suggested this causal relationship,
My evidence is the psychological principles mentioned, plus subjective
judgment based on personal observation in some "underdeveloped" areas.
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The Tokugawa family, who hold the shogunate (or office of military
dictator) from 1603 to 1868, had as a main goal the prevention of change
in the social order. They ejected foreign traders from Japan, except
for a small group of Dutch at Nagasaki. They kept the Dutch there, partly
to obtain desired imports, but partly deliberately to have a channel of
information concerning the West. A contemporary Japanese said: "To
defend ourselves against the barbarians, we must know them and ourselves:
1,26
the way to know them is through Dutch studies.
Before 1800 Dutch grammars and dictionaries had been prepared, language
schools opened, and "scores of books or parts of books" on many fields
of Western science, engineering, history, and politics translated.
Later, important schools for "the study of barbarian books" were opened.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, laboratories were established
26. Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development
in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880 (Stanford University Press,
1955), p. 2 . Smith cites only two non-Japanese works concerning early
Japanese exploration of Western knowledge, one in Dutch, one in English:
C.R. Boxer, Jan Companie in Japan, 1600-1817 (The Hague, 1936), and
Donald Keene, The Japanese Discovery of Europe: Honda Toshiaki and Other
Discoverers, 1720-1789 (London, 1952). He cites many Japanese sources.
My account is mainly from him. See also M.J. Levy, loc,cit.; E.H. Norman,
Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1950); G.B. Sansom, Japan, A Short Cultural History, rev. ed.,
(New York: Appleton-Century, 1943), and The Western World and Japan
(New York: Knopf, 1950); and J.C. Moloney, Understanding the Japanese Mind
(New York: Philosophical Library, 195). Moloney presents a psychological
interpretation of Japanese culture and Japanese development whose validity
I am unable to judge, but parts of which I believe other psychologists
question.
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and many pilot metallurgical processes were performed, guided purely
by study of the books, and without technical aid. Full scale enterprises
were then established. Before Perry's arrival in 1853, an iron ore
smelter, one or more reverberatory furnaces, and an iron foundry were in
operation. The center of interest was avowedly defense, and emphasis was
on iron and steel, munitions production, and after revocation in 18653
of an order forbidding shipbuilding, on shipbuilding. After 1853, the
Japanese imported European technicians on a considerable scale, and in
addition to defense industries developed coal mining, textile manufacturing,
and commercial enterprises. All of this activity was by the feudal
"clans" which formed a part of the government structure, and by the
Tokugawa themselves; in part the consumer goods industries were developed
to meet the need for revenue to finance the defense industries.
This development had been in the name of defending the traditional
social order againd barbarian invasion. The Japanese knew of Western
invasion of Asian areas, for example, Indonesia and India. During the
nineteenth century they were keenly aware of Western intrusion into
China. When Perry appeared with four warships in 1853 and demanded a
treaty, anti-foreign feeling became intense. In succeeding years it was
inflamed further by Western humiliation of Japan through forced treaties,
violation of Japanese conventions of personal behavior, and acts such as
27
the bombardment of Kagoshima by the British. If the Westerners had
27. In retaliation for the beheading by a samurai of an Englishman
_V& M teta fT~ wiA-i 4&y japarp~o weiii 1 g' dIvobee' Vt~J. ith siilA
dospatehv noly rajaing h4.9 eyes3 -m I "isla at the &pr as he~ -Paoz
invaded Japan then, the Japanese would have resisted and been defeated,
and, I suggest, colonial rule would have brought the emotional confusion
it brought elsewhere.
But the foreigners did not invade Japan and rupture Japanese culture.
They gave Japan a breathing spell. During the fifteen years following
1853 an internal struggle raged. 'On one side were the clans (or clan
leaders) who preached that the barbarians should be expelled, but who
opposed the internal change, involving radical change in their own positions
and functions, necessary to make the expulsion possible. Faced with
reality, they were paralyzed. As each foreign demand forced the issue,
they supported the shogun in his concessions, and took no other action,
On the other side were the clans and individuals within clans who advocated
dealing with the barbarians of necessity, meanwhile altering Japan's
social institutions in order to create a modern army and navy and to
carry out technological advance to the ultimate end of repelling the
foreigners. Their analysis of the need for social change to accomplish
the other changes was sound. With the prevailing class rigidities, it
was not possible to obtain the necessary talent in the new functions.
And under the feudal dispersion of power, the central government 's only
sources of revenue were the extensive landholding of the Tokugawa plus
the enterprises developed by the Tokugawa themselves. It had neither
the power to collect taxes nor other powers necessary for forceful action.
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But the struggle was not merely one of ideas; it was a struggle of
social groups to escape or avoid subordination for themselves, and also
for Japan as a whole. In 1868 a group of fairly low-ranking samurai
from the rebel clans took over the government, under the guise of restoring
the power of the emperor. Allied with them were merchants, wealthy peasant
landlords, and industrialists. gach had its own motivation. The warrior
function of the samurai had gradually withered; their allowances had
gradually been reduced by their dainyo or lords; they were heavily in
debt to merchants and others, and repeated laws for their relief had been
necessary. The motivation of the merchants was to burst the feudal
28
restrictions on their social position which have alreaWbeen discussed.
29
The wealthy peasants, who were educated both in government and war,
had found their social position steadily deteriorating, because of their
weakening control of local communities and the deterioration of community
institutions, both trends being consequences of the growing monetization
of the economy. The industrialists were individuals drawn from the
other three groups.
But the purpose of each group was not merely to restore or augment
previous power. The victo ious samrai moved to eliminate, not restore
their old functions and status, and to move forward with technological
change. A drive to save the nation from subordination was an important
element in the motivation of all.
28. PAge 12, above.
29. See Smith, op.cit., Chapter II.
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Thus the Japanese change was not sudden. Change in the elements
discussed in Section 2 had prepared the way, and reaction to subordination
or very real and justified fear of subordination provided the energy
for the social revolution. Given these developments, Japan created
the economic institutions that she lacked. But the old powerfully in-
fluenced the new; the course of her development from 1868 to the present
was markedly different from that in the West because it was powerfully
influenced by the persistence of previous social values and relationships.
The record of Japan's economic revolutions illustrates the principle
of reaction to subordination operating between societies. The dominant
groups in Japan began to introduce Western learning and modern industry
during the Tokugawa era. They did so because they feared social sub-
ordination by foreign groups. Though dominant at home they were in
prospect, in their own eyes, a subordinated group.
They could not however bring themselves to carry out the social
revolution necessary to complete their economic program. This was done
by groups who were subordinated within Japan. Thus the history of Japan
doubly confirms the thesis suggested above that reaction to subordination
is necessary for the transition.
In conclusion, the relationship of the theses presented here to a
much-discussed alternative hypothesis should be suggested. This is the
hypothesis that whether development occurs depends on the religious temper
of the society. The transition occurs because the society possesses
,30
what Weber termed the "Protestant ethic. Briefly, the Protestant ethic
30. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,
translated by T. Parsons (New York. Scribner & Sons, 1948).
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is the doctrine that the duty of man is to glorify God by developing
to the utmost the world that God has created. This religious value, where
it exists, creates a high valuation on thrift, austerity, and economic
achievement.
The theory that the Protestant ethic causes economic development is
given a high degree of plausibility by the sequence of events in Western
Europe in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Robert
K. Merton has pointed out that the Protestant religious groups of the
seventeanth century regarded the glorification of God by good works on
earth as the supreme duty of man, and that good works came to be inter-
preted as successful economic activity, and has shown that the scientists
31
and economic innovators of the period were predominantly Dissenters.
Calvinist doctrine presumably stimulated economic achievement in one way,
the doctrines of the non-Calvinist Dissenters in another, but both
effectively. The non-Calvinist Dissenters taught that man may gain
salvation by good works on earth. Calvin taught that one's fate in
life hereafter is predestined from birth, but that whether a person is
possessed of a "state of grace" can be seen by his works. "A good tree
bringeth forth good fruit." The non-Calvinist ethic, insofar as it
affected human behavior, did so by creating in the individual an urge
to save himself from eternal damnation by performing good works on earth.
31. Robert K. Merton, "Science, Religion, and Technology in Seventeenth
Century England," Osiris, 1938, Vol. IV, pp. 360-632. For a summary of
the material there contained, see alternatively, Robert K. Merton,
Social Theory and Social Structure, (New York: 1949).
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Calvinist doctrine, on the other hand, created in each Calvinist a
drive to demonstrate to himself that he stood in a state of grace and
would be saved, by performing the good works which were the external
evidence.
The effect of both the Calvinist and non-Calvinist Protestant
doctrines, as sketched above, was via a rational or conscious channel.
It is not man's conscious thought processes, but the emotional associations
below the level of consciousness, that determine how he will spend his
energies during his life. However, it is easy to see that the childhood
environment in the homes of Dissenters might have created such motivations.
McClelland has presented interesting evidence that the Protestant ethic
leads to "independence training," that is, early childhood training
encouraging independent actions at an early age, and tending thus to
cause the child to feel satisfaction and emotional security in inde-
pendent behavior.32 The connection between this training and economic
achievement has been suggested above.33
In Weber 's version of the Protestant ethic thesis, the ethic comes
to exist because of (unspecified) causes that are presumably quite un-
related to economic change, and then causes economLc development. However,
the Protestant ethic may be a result, not of religious doctrines but of
32. D.C. McClelland, "Some Social Consequences of Achievement
Motivation," in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Marshall Jones, ed.(1955)
pp. 41-72.
33. Pages 18-26.
a drive by a subordinated group both to gain satisfaction through economic
activity and to rationalise this activity in religious doctrine. The
Protestants may have "created God in their o image, " rather than the
reverse. This seems to me to be a plausible explanation of the devel-
opment of the ethic. Unless and until an alternative explanation is
presented that seems more plausible in the 1:ht of Western European
history, I suggest that the Protestant ethic should be considered as
a channel through which reaction to subordination operated.
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4. Conclusion
This essay has attempted to analyze causal sequences in the process
of social change from a "traditional" to a technologically progressive
state. The problem has received little attention in the professional
literature, and parts of the theoretical structure presented here are new.
The most obvious of these, it seems to the writer, is the loosely-structured
discussion of elements of a traditional culture which may be expected to
change as economic development occurs. A second is a brief statement of
the factors which determine an individual's choice of occupation.
Central to the entire argument is the hypothesis presented on pages 32-36
concerning the role of "tsubordinated" groups in the process of change.
This includes discussions of the ways in which "subordination" may lead
to radical alteration in the motivations of successive generations, and
of the circumstances in which such a change in motivations may lead to
the institutionalizing of continuing technological change.
All of these suggestions are tentative and untested, some of them
may have to be discarded, Obviously, they will as a minimum be much
modified, elaborated, and refined by professional discussion and by
research insofar as research can be applied to test them. The essay
is presented as a starting point for analysis and in the hope that it
will stimulate discussion among scholars interested in the process of
cultural change.
